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PRE,FACE
JACK KNIGHT
This volume of NOMOS-the fifty-seventh in the series-emerged
from papers and commentaries given at the annual meeting of
the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy in New
Orleans, Louisiana, onJanuary 4,2013, held in conjunction with
the annual meeting of the American Association of Law Schools.
Our topic, "Immigration, Emigration, and Migration" was selected
by the Society's membership.
The conference consisted of three panels, corresponding to the
three parts of this volume: (1) "\Mhy Do States Have the Right to
Control Immigration?," (2) "Law's Migrations, Mobilities, and Bor-
ders," and (3) "Immigration and Legitimate International Insti-
tutions." The volume includes revised versions of the principal
papers delivered atthat conference by Sarah Song,Judith Resnik,
and Thomas Christiano. It also includes essays that developed out
of the original commentaries on those papers by Adam B. Cox,
Michael Blake, James Bohman, Jennifer Hochschild, and Cristina
M. Rodriguez. I am grateful to all these authors for their insightful
contributions.
Thanks are also due to the editors and production team at New
York University Press, and particularly to Caelyn Cobb. On behalf
of the Society, I wish to express gratitude for the Press's ongoing
support for the series and the tradition of interdisciplinary schol-
arship that it represents.
Finally, thanks to Andrew Rehfeld of Washington University in
St. Louis for organizing the original conference with me and to
Samuel Bagg of Duke University for providing expert assistance
during the editorial and production phases of this volume.
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PART I
WFIYDO STAIES HAVE
THE RIGHT TO CONTROL
IMMIGRAIION?
1\,\,IFIY DOES THE STAIE FIAVE THE, RIGHT
TO CONTROL IMMIGRAIION?
SARAFI SONG
Public debate about immigration proceeds on the assumption that
each country has the right to control its own borders. The right to
control immigration is broadly assumed to flow from state sover-
eignty. This view is reflected in early American immigration juris-
prudence. In establishing the national government's power over
immigration, the U.S. Supreme Court declared, "Every nation
has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-
preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its domin-
ion, or to admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions
as it may see fit to prescribe."r The power to control immigration
has been qualified in certain respects by international law, such
as in the case of diplomats whose privileges are well-defined in
law and over whom the host state's discretion is limited. However,
when it comes to the question of the right to exclude foreigners,
international law accords enormous discretion to states. While
there are constitutional limits in some countries on how nonciti-
zens already inside the territory can be treated, when it comes to
foreigners outside the territory states may act solely on the basis
of considerations of advantage or convenience. As Linda Bosniak
has observed, this "hard on the outside and soft on the inside"
approach is reflected not only in law but also in many normative
theories of migration and citizenship: an ethic of inclusion applies
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to noncitizens inside the territorial boundaries of the state, while
an ethic of exclusion applies to those outside.2
- 
8,", what, if anything, justifies the modern state,s power over
borders? \Arhy, if at all, does the state have the right to control immi_gration? Many scholars of immigration and c]tizenship take thisquestion for granted, focusing instead on questions ab&t the sub_
stantive content and procedures of immigration law and policy. The
reason for this is partly pragmatic. Aftei all, states exisi, u.rj th.y
exercise power over borders, whether or not there is a good justi_fication for such exercise. In addition, scholars of migr"ation"and
citizenship understandably focus their attentio, or, 
-Jr. pressingquestions about the substance and procedures of immigration pol-
icy. But I also think that,many immigration schorars .."utty b.ti.r.
that the state has the right to control its own borders, even if they
have not developed the normative grounds of theirview.
. T^"*: illt all, might the stare,s right to conrrol immigration bejustified? This chaptbr provides u., u.r.*., in three sectio"ns. First, I
examine the earliest. immigration raw cases in U.s. history in orderto uncover the underlying assumptions about sovereignty andimmigration control that make up the normative found-ations ofU.S. immigration law These cases rely on dominant principles ofinternational law of the day, especialiy the work of Emer de Vat_tel' I argue that while these cases make clear the great extent ofthe state's power over immigration, the leading thlorist they rely
on falls short of providing adequate normativejusdfication of the
state's right to contror immigration. In the second section, I turn
to^ contemporary political theory and philosophy for justificarions
of the right to control immigration. I critically arr.r, ,ir.. leading
arguments, based on (1) cultural and national identiry (2) freel_dom of associarion, and (3) properry. In the third and final sec_tion, I offer an alternative argument based on the idea of demo-
cratic self-determination.
I. SovennrcNTy AND IuurcnarroN CoNrnor
rN U.S. IulrrcnerroN Law
The U.S. government's power over immigration_its ,,plenary
power"-was established by the U.S. Supreme Court,s decisionin the chinese Exclusion case (1g89).s Thi; case is a good place to
begin our analysis of the normative foundations of the modern
state's right to control immigration because it contains the Ameri-
can nation's very first assertion of national sovereignty over immi-
gration. It marked, in Rogers Smith's words, a "significantly novel"
and "momentous" shift toward viewing immigration regulations as
acts of relatively unbridled national sovereignty, not exercises of
the police powers of state governments or the federal commerce
power as was the case for much of the nineteenth century.a \Arhat
normative principles ground this assertion of state sovereignty and
the power to control immigration?
Chae Chan Ping, a Chinese laborer, came to the United States
in 1876, in a period when the Burlingame Treaty of 1868 seemed
to permit unrestricted immigration from China. The United States
had negotiated the treaty with an eye toward recruiting Chinese
laborers and improving trade with China, but racist and nativist
sentiments against the Chinese became widespread in California
and nationally. In 1882, Congress suspended immigration of Chi-
nese laborers for ten years. Those already in the United States who
wished to leave and return were required to obtain certificates to
show they had come before November 1880. Chae obtained a cer-
tificate in 1887 and returned to his native China. The following
yeaq while he was still abroad, Congress barred the return of Chi-
nese laborers, regardless ofwhether they had certificates.
Aboard a ship in San Francisco Bay, Chae challenged the 1888
statute in a petition for habeas corpus on two grounds. First, he
argued that the statute violated the 1880 treaty provision that Chi-
nese laborers already in the United States could leave and return.
Writing for the majority, Justice Field acknowledged the conflict
betr,veen the treaty and statute but found that although they were
on an equal footing, the statute prevailed because it was enacted
later in time. Chae's second challenge was that, as a constitutional
matter, the 1888 statute was "beyond the competency of Congress
to pass it."5 This case provided the Court with its first opportunity
to address directly the question of the federal government's power
to exclude foreigners.o In setting out the conceptual framework
for immigration law, the Court's main concern was to establish the
federal government's immigration power under the Constitution,
not to question whether the rights of individual aliens might con-
strain Congress's immigration power.T
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that Nishimura was likely to become a public charge, which in turn
made her excludable under the statute. She argued that due pro-
cess required a judicial proceeding.l2 As in the Chinese Exclusion
Case, the Court invoked principles of international law to establish
that the immigration power belonged to the federal government
and the political branches in particular:
It is an accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign
nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to
self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its
dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon such con-
ditions as it may see fit to prescribe. . . . It belongs to the political
department of the government.13
In establishing the government's immigration power, the Court
cites the Swiss author Emer de Vattel, whose Les droit d,es gens (The
Law of Nations, 1758) was the most important book on international
law in the eighteenth century. Vattel was "the favorite authority in
American theory of international law" in the first decades after
the American founding, and his influence in the United States
extended through the nineteenth century.la The passages of Vat-
tel cited by the Court in Nishimura focus on the right of sovereign
nations to refuse entry to foreigners:
The sovereign may forbid the entrance of his territory either to
foreigners in general, or in particular cases, or to certain persons,
or for certain particular purposes, according as they may think it
advantageous to the state. There is nothing in all this, thar does not
flow from the rights of domain and sovereignty.ls
After this passage cited by the Court, Vattel goes on to discuss the
example of the Chinese government, which "fearing lest the inter-
course of strangers should corrupt the manners of the nation, and
impair the maxims of a wise but singular government, forbade all
people entering the empire." Such a prohibition was "not at all
inconsistent with justice, provided they did not refuse humane
assistance to those whom tempest or necessity obliged to approach
their frontiers. It was salutary to the nation, without violating the
rights of any individual, or even the duties of humanity, which
Justice Field held that the federal government has the power to
r-egulate immigration and that the political branches .orrld .*.r_
cise this power without being subjeci to judicial review:
The power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sover_
eignty belonging to the governmenr of the United States, as part of
those sovereign powers delegated by the Constitution, the .ight to
its exercise at any time when, in the judgment of the governlent,
the interests of the country require it, cannot be granted away or
restrained on behalf of any one. . \{rhatever license, therefore,
Chinese laborers may have obtained, previous to the act of October
1, 1888, to return to rhe Unired States after their departure, is held
at the will of the government, revocable at any time, at its pleasure.(609)8
The principles upon which the Court established Congress,spower to control immigration were maxims of internation"al lawdominant at the time, which viewed the right to exclude as essen_tial to sovereignty:
That the government of the United States, through the action of
the legislative department, can exclude aliens riom its territorv is aproposition which we do not think open to controversy.Jurisdiction
over its own territory to that extent is an incident of every indepen_
dent narion' It is a part of its independence. If it could not e*ci.,d.
aliens it would be to that extent subject to the control of another
power.e
The Court goes on to affirm a virtually unlimited right to exclude,including the exclusion of ,,foreigners of a differen*t race . . . who
will not assimilate with us,, and ire thereby ,,dangerous to [the]peace and security" of the nation.10
Two years later, in Nishimura Ekiu u. United. States (lgg2), theCourt expanded the plenary power doctrine in two ways.1l fi.rt, itbroadened the plenary por.ido.t.ine by applying it to Corgr.sr,sprocedures in the enforcement of immigruti"" ti*. u.ra .ritlrriits substantive rules for admission and eicrusion as in the chinaeExclusion casa. Second, it rejected a chalrenge based on a claim ofindividual constirurional right. An adminisiative officer declared
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permit us, in case of competition, to prefer ourselves to others,,(rr.e4).
vattel's references to 'Justice" and "humane assistance,, hint at
moral constraints on state sovereignty. He claimed to be follow-ing the German author Christian W"iff, whose lus gentium method,
scientifica pertractatum (The Law of Nations Treated, Aciord,ing to scien-
tif,c Method, l74g) Yattel expressly sought to develop anj extend.
Wolff derived the duty ro mutual aid by way of an analogy berween
the law of nature among individuals and the law of natire among
states. wolff's naturalism was influenced by Aristotle and has ante-
cedents in Aquinas, Grotius, and Leibniz. in this tradition, nature
exhibits an order and tereorogy to which the faculty of reason giveshuman beings privileged access.r. The ,,law of nations,, was siiplythe law of nature of ind,iuid,ucr,l^s in the state of nature u, upph.ato states.. Vattel adopted.this analogy, clinging to the tanguage of
naturalism but limiting it1 lole to the suppori of individrid .Iglrt,in a liberal society. Like worff, vatter vilwed "a polirical ,o.iZty,,
as "a moral person" with "an understandi.rg urd a will of wrricrrit makes use for the conduct of its affairs.,,-When a people con-fer sovereignty on any one person, they thereby .,invest him withtheir understanding and will, and make over to him their obli_gations and rights, so far as relates to the administration of the
state, and to the exercise of the public authority,, (L40).17 As inthe case of persons, the primary duties of states u.. (fl t" p;_
serve and perfect themselves, and (2) to assist each other in fuinU_ing those duties each state owed to itself. states should ,,cultivate
human society," primarily through trade so long as the pursuit of
commerce did not conflict with their primary duties to themselves.
Yet states, like persons, should remain free and independent, con_
strained by the rules necessary for their common sociew but other-
wise autonomous (I.23). Vattel optimistically suggested that states,
acting upon the principles of narural tr* uior..]iould ultimatelyform a urriversal republic: "A rear friendship will be ,."., to ..ig,,
among them; and this happy state consists.in a mutual affectiJn,,(rr.12).
Vattel's optimism was counterbalanced and ultimatelv out_
weighed by his realism. He acknowledged *most natiom ai-
only to strengthen and enrich themselves at the expense of oth-
ers" (II.16). Self-interest prevents states from adhering to the
principle of mutual aid in foreign affairs. Instead, he suggests that
states should rely on a morally less appealing but more workable
vision of a world order based on a balance of power. In doing so,
he repudiated Wolff's idea of a ciuitas maxima as the foundation
of the voluntary law of nations in favor of a system of sovereign
states based on a balance of power.18 Vattel emphasized that while
nations, like individuals, have a general duty of assistance to oth-
crs, this duty was limited by the perfect right of a state to its own
self-preservation and self-perfection.ls The duty of mutual aid is
a contingent obligation, extending only insofar as a nation's lib-
erty and well-being permit. Vattel derives moral obligation not
liom an external source but from what he viewed as man's most
basic motive: self-love and a desire for the happiness of a perfect
soul.2o He applied this very same motive to nations: a nation's
duty of self-preservation and self-perfection could be derived only
Iiom its basic self-interest and its desire to attain the highest level
of national happiness. Like individuals, nations could attain col-
lective happiness only by developing more enlightened forms of
self-interest, forms that take into account the well-being of other
rrations but that make the national interest primary.21
Wolff and Vattel were the first to provide an explicit articula-
tion of the principle of nonintervention, the key element of West-
phalian sovereignty. The fundamental norm of Westphalian sov-
creignqz is that "states exist in specific territories, within which
domestic political authorities are the sole arbiters of legitimate
behavior."22 Vattel argued that no state had the right to inter-
vene in the domestic affairs of other states. Although he adopts
irn argument made earlier by Pufendorf, Vattel is frequently cred-
ited with giving the principle of the equality of sovereign states the
prominence it has had in international law ever since. Reasoning
by analogy, he claimed thatjust as men are equal in the state of
nature, states are also equal, regardless of whether they are small
republics or large kingdoms. Vattel was, of course, aware that states
are actually vastly unequal in resources and power, but his point
about equality-understood as a normative principle-was that all
nations are equally independent, equal in dignity, and equal in the
rights and duties they have under natural law.23
Vattel's theory of sovereignty has had important implications for
the legal regulation of the movement of goods and people across
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borders. A state's duty to self-preservation and self-perfection is
"perfect": it outweighs the obligation to assist other states in their
efforts to preserve and perfecl themselves. The state,s duty to
other.states is "imperfect": it does not create an obligation to do
anything in particular, and no other state can claim to have beeninjured by an alleged violation of it. So, for example, while a state
ought to enter into mutuaily advantageous trade relations with
other states and seil its products at a f,fair price," considerations
of self-preservation allow it to limit trade or even reject commerce
with other states altogether.
. 
Vatte-l's realist perspective also has implications for immigra_tion policy' As in the case of trade, a state courd decide to crose
off its borders entirely to strangers, including those seeking a rightof passag^e to "escape from imminent danglr,, o. *p.o.riJe] t"fre
means of subsistence," if it proved contrary to the interest. oi trr.
nation.2a In consider:ing whether the ,,exiled or banished,, have a
"right to dwell somewhere on earth," vattel erred on the side of
asserting a state's right to exclude:
Every nation has a right to refuse admitting a foreigner into her
territory, when he cannot enter it without exposing the nation to
evident danger, or doing her a manifest injury. \A{hat she owes to
herself, the care ofher own safery gives h.r this right; and in virtue
of her natural liberty, it belongs to the nation to judge, whether her
circumstances will or will not justi!, the admission of that foreigner.(r.230)
Thus also it has a right to send fasylees] elsewhere, if it has just
cause to fear that they will corrupt the manners of the citizens, ihat
they will create religious disturbances, or occasion any other disor-det contrary to the public safety. In a word, it has a right, and is
even obliged, to follow, in this respect, the suggestions ofprudence.(r.231)
These two, passages were cited in their entirety by the U.S.Supreme Court in Fong yue Ting a. United States IAOZI to expandthe U.S. government's power over immigration.2i In this case', il;Court expanded plenary power beyonj tine exclusion of foreign_
ers outside the territory to d.eltortation of resident aliens alrea'd'
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inside the U.S. territory. An 1892 statute had extended the ban
on Chinese immigration for ten years. Those already residing in
the United States could stay only if they could get a white witness
to testify to their pre-1892 residency. Fong and two other Chinese
laborers claimed pre-l892 residency but were unable to produce
white witnesses.
Writing for the majority, Justice Gray rejected Fong's constitu-
tional challenge to the white witness rule, finding no meaningful
distinction between the power to exclude a noncitizen outside the
territory and the power to deport a noncitizen already present in
the territory: "The power to exclude aliens and the power to expel
them rest upon one foundation, are derived from one source, are
supported by the same reasons, and are in truth but parts of one
and the same power."26 Relying on both tlte Chinese Exclusion Case
and Nishimura, Justice Gray concluded that the political branches
could continue to regulate immigration immune from judicial
review. In a subsequent case, Yamataya u. Fisher (1903), the Court
suggested that a noncitizen already inside the U.S. territory who
objected to deportation procedures might have some success.2T
\tVhile leaving the plenary power doctrine untouched, the Court
refused to permit Yamataya's deportation on two grounds: (1)
aliens inside the United States can invoke more constitutional
safeguards than aliens outside the territory and (2) courts review-
ing deportation orders should examine procedural due process
questions more closely than substantive immigration rules.28
Taken together, these four foundational immigration law
cases suggested constitutional objections by foreigners outsifu the
United States would not be successful, but foreigners insidc the
United States might have some success in challenging deportation
orders.2e We have seen how the Court, drawing on Vattel, estab-
lished the federal government's immigration power by declaring
it to be "inherent in sovereignty." The right to exclude foreigners
was simply assumed to be crucial to the self-preservation of states.
Yet, neither the Court nor the key theorist cited by the Court
1>rovides a compelling justification for the state's right to control
immigration.
Vattel himself viewed territorial sovereignty as analogous to
private property, but what he says is more metaphorical than
rtdequate to the task ofjustifying territorial sovereignty. \t/hile he
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distinguishes between 
_the concepts of sovereign rule (empire) andownership (domain) of the national territory "he tends to .rnpfru-
size their interreratedness. He defines the concepts in the follow-ing way:
1. The domain, by virtue of which the nation alone may use this
country for the supply of its necessities, may dispose of it
as it thinks proper, and derive from it .u.ry adru.tug. ii i,
capable of yielding.
2. The empire, or the right of sovereign command, by which the
nation directs and regulates at its pleasure every thing that
passes in the country. (I.20\
Vattel also emphasizes the connection between ownership and
sovereignty in discussing how a nation comes to acquire sover_
eignty: "\4hen a nation takes possession of a country tL which noprior owner can lay claim, it is considered as acquiring the empire or
sovereignty of it, at the same time with the d,omain. 
.-. . The *not.
space over which a nation extends its government, becomes the
seat of its jurisdiction, and is cailed itsle*itory" (I.20b). A nation
may acquire sovereignty by another route: "a number of free fami-lies" who were "previously in possession of the domair." *uy ".,r:t.for the purpose of forming a nation or state,, and thereby {.q;;.the sov-ereignry over the whole country they inhabi,; (I.ZOO).Thereafter, although different types of properry (private, com_
mon, joint) may be legally established within the national territory,the nation continues to enjoy a kind of ownership 
"", ""ff "u..the land but also over everything within its territory that is ,,suscep_
lib]: :f ownership," including [oods to which private individuaishold legal title (L235).
Vattel's blurring of ownership and sovereignty must be under_
stood in historical context. \4hile political"rule urd p.op..ty
ownership were distinguished for some purposes by the RomanIaw terms imperium and. d,ominium, the laiter te.m also connoted
rule, especially in medieval usage, that was retained in the Eng_lish word "dominions" and the technical use of d,ominiumin jurii_prudence to denote the territorial dimension of ,or...igrry.\Alhile property came to be thought of as private and thus devoid
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of public authoriry ownership of certain property carried with it
lhe franchise until modern times. And because the state's sover-
cign authority extended not only over people but also over land,
<'onceptions of sovereignty continued to include attributes of
ownership in addition to jurisdiction and legislation. As Whelan
observes, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, although
the two terms are distinguished, there is a substantial amount of
< onceptual overlap, usually to the advantage of absolutist and pat-
r imonial theories, which in one way or another portray the ruler as
rrot only the sovereign but also the owner of his country.3o
How, then, might we understand Vattel's emphasis on the con-
rrection between sovereignty and "public ownership of a country"
il'not for the reason of defending absolutist and patrimonial theo-
lies, which he explicitly rejected? One reason for emphasizing the
< onnection is that sovereign power includes some specific powers
lhat appear to be derived from the nation's collective ownership of
the goods in its territory (e.g., the power of eminent domain and
the power of taxation). Second, it supports Vattel's derivation of
llre state's right to exclufu aliens from the state's right of ounership of
lhe country:
Since the lord of the territory may, whenever he thinks proper, for-
bid its being entered, he has no doubt a power to annex what con-
ditions he pleased to the permission to enter. This . . . is a conse-
quence of the right of domain. Can it be necessary to add, that the
owner of the territory ought in this instance to respect the duties of
humanity? The case is the same with all rights whatever: the propri-
etor may use them at his discretion.3l
Vattel's derivation proceeds by way of analogy: just as a properry
()wner can exclude others from his property, the sovereign state
< :rn exclude foreigners from its territory. As I will argue later, while
illetaphorically alluring, the property argument for a state's right
to exclude falls short as a convincing justification of the state's
light to control borders. I turn now to take up the question to
which Vattel and early American immigration jurisprudence do
rrot provide a satisfactory answer: \A4tat, if anything, justifies the
rnodern state's right to control immigration?
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II. CoNrrnaeonanvJusrrFrcATroNS oF A Srarr,s
Rrcrrr ro CoNrnor Iulrtcnetlroi.r
This section examines three leading normative justifications ofa state's right to control immigration, based on three distinctgrounds (1) cultural and narionar identiry (2) freedom of associa-tion, and (3) property. I discuss the limits of these a.g.rm..rt withthe aim of setting the stage for an alternative justifi"cation in thefinal section of the chapter.
A. Cultural and National lclentity
In his well-known discussion of the idea of membership, MichaelWalzer offers a defelsl.of the state,s right to control immigration
based on the value of distinctiae culturesZnd. groups:
The distinctiveness of cultures and groups depends upon closure
and, without it, cannot be conceived as a stable feature of humanlife. If this distinctiveness is a value, as most people seem to
believe, then closure must be permitted somewhere. At some level
of political organization, something like the sovereign state must
take shape and claim the authority to make its own admissions pol_
icy, to control and sometimes restrain the flow of immigrants.32
Walzer's argument here assumes that a central purpose of statesis the protection of distinctive cultures and groups. Combined
with the empirical premise that protection of distinctive cultures
"depends upon closure,,, he concludes that ,.something like the
sovereign state" must form and craim the authority to maie its own
admissions policy.
Walzer echoes Vattel in suggesting the right to control immigra_tion flows from state sovereignty ani then "-or", to offer a;uJln_
cation of this right in terms of cultural preservation:
Admission and exclusion are at the core of communal independence.
They suggest the deepest meaning of self-determination. without
them, there could not be communities of character, historically stable,
ongoing associations of men and women with some special commit_
ment to one another and some special sense of their common 1ife.33
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I,'or Walzer, the normative ground for a state's right to control
irnmigration is the preservation of a distinctive communal iden-
tity. As for the extent of this right, Walzer recognizes that selG
rletermination is "not absolute": it is subject "both to internal deci-
sions by the members themselves" and to "the external principle
of mutual aid."3a If we look at Walzer's discussion of particular
t'xamples, the constraints on the state's right to exclude appear to
lre quite weak. The right of nations to cultural self-determination
is taken to be consistent with the "White Australia" poticy in which
the Australian government imposed racial restrictions in its immi-
gration policy.S5 It is not surprising that an account of state sov-
creignty based on preserving the "distinctiveness of cultures and
groups" would include racial exclusion in light of the historical
salience of race to national identity.
Political theorist David Miller has developed the cultural argu-
nrent for a state's right to control borders in more explicitly nation-
rt,list terms focusing on language and what he calls "public cul-
trrre." Miller views the right to control immigration as part of a
rnore general theory of a state's territorial rights, which includes
r'ontrol over the land itself, resources on the land, and the move-
rnent of people and things across territorial borders. Miller takes
tlre following as his starting premises:
1. The public culture of many societies is worth preserving.
2. Citizens of these societies have an interest in controlling "the
way that their nation develops, including the values that are
contained in the public culture."36
Ile points to the example of Qu6bec. The French language is a
vital part of Qu6b6cois culrure and identity. eu6b6cois citizens
lrave good reason to "differentiate sharply among prospective
irnmigrants belween those who speak the national language and
those who don't." Miller leaves open how restrictive an immigra-
lion policy has to be in order to maintain "cultural continuity,,; it
will depend on'"the empirical question of how easy or difficult it is
l() create a syrnbiosis between the existing public culture and the
rrcw cultural values of the immigrants."3T
On the nationalist account, a state's right to control immigra-
tion is the collective right of nations with deep ties to the territory.
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There are at least two ways that proponents of such a view have
conceived of the relationship between the nation and territory.The first is an argument about national id.entit4. Territory i, tuk.,to be central to the development of national identity. On l,litter,s
account, there is a two_way interaction between a state,s territory
and the culture of the people who live on it. On the one hand, the
culture adapts to the territory: whether the climate is hot or cold
or whether the territory landrocked or open to the sea will encour-
age the development of certain .rrto*, and discourage others.On the other hand, the territory itself will be shaped and"reshaped
according to the ,,cultural priorities,, of the people as they maketheir lives upon the land. Their "transformation; of the land may
not be intentionar or coordinated, but it nonetheless reflects their
"cultural values." Through living on and shaping the land, tfr. f.o-ple endow it "with meaning byvirtue of significant events thut hur.
occurred there, monuments that have been built, poems, novels,
and paintings that capture particular places or tlpes of landscape,,;the inhabitants of a land come to attach ,utr. io living in , pi;.that is rich in historical meaning.3s The philosopher ihaim'Gans
makes a similar claim: the fact thit a territory is ..of primary impo.tance in forming the historical identity of the group , is considered
"a strong enough reason for the purposes oi deGrmining sover_
eignty over it."3e
A second way that proponents of the nationalist account ofterritorial rights have connected nations and territory i, u qrruJ-Lockean argument about labor.It is not only in virtue of _j;i;g
my labor with the land but also in virtue of my adding ;;;;laboring on a piece of land that I come to have a legitimate claim
of ownership over it. In Locke,s well_known formulat]on:
'[he labor of his body, and the worh of his hands, we may say, areproperly his. \A{hatsoever then he removes out ol the state that
nature hath provided, and reft it in, he hath mixed iis rabor vith,
and.joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it
his prope.rty 
. . . . tll t is labor indeed. that puts the d.ifference of aalue on
every thing.ao
On Locke's account, labor_is the ground for private property
rights. Building on Locke,s labor thlory of value, Tamar Meisels
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lras developed a nationalist theory of territorial rights based on the
( ()ncept of "settlement." Settlement refers not only to the physical
l)r'esence of individuals on a piece of land but also to "the exis-
Icnce of a permanent physical infrastructure," which members
ol'the nation have constructed. Sometimes such settlements are
lrrrilt in a conscious, premeditated manner, but more often than
rrot they "simply evolve over time" as individuals or members of
particular groups settle in a given place.al Similarly, Miller argues
tllat as the members of the nation "transform" the land, thereby
rr<lding value to it, "the nation as a whole has a legitimate claim to
llre enhanced value that the territory now has."a2
It is important to note that Meisels's and Miller's arguments are
rluasi-Lockean. While they are inspired by Locke's labor theory
ol'value, their appeal to Lockean principles is more metaphori-
r':rl than literal.a3 \A/hat is crucial to the nationalist justification is
tlrc expressiue element reflected in claims of "settlement" (Meisels)
or' "transformation" (Miller). Acts of settlement/transforma-
tion express a particular national identiry. By working the land,
rncmbers of a nation are not simply adding value to it; they are,
:rs Meisels puts it, "shaping the territory so as to coincide with a
p:rrticular way of life." For example, nations must "choose between
v:trious modes of architecture and forms of agriculture," as well
lrs "whether to industrialize, and, if so, to what extent and in
what fields" and "whether to build churches or synagogues or
rrrosques."aa The enhanced value cannot be separated from the ter-
ritory itself. Because the value added by the labor of the nation
is, in Miller's words, "embodiedin cultivated fields, buildings, roads,
wilterways, and all the rest," there is no way for the nation to retain
llrzrt enhanced value without also retaining the territory. Thus,
tlre case for a nation's right over the relevant territory is "straight-
lirrward": such a right "gives members of the nation continuing
ir('cess to places that are especially significant to them, and it allows
choices to be made over how these sites are to be protected and
nranaged."a5
Nationalist arguments for a state's right to control immigration
srrffer from at least four problems. First, they fail to account for
tlre right of collectiae ownership, which is crucial for the nationalist
:rccount to go through. The labor of "settlement" and the work of
"lransformation" of the land are performedby indiuiduals, notby
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rrnd places of worship as well as till fields and plant crops. Could
they then declare that they have rights of territorial 
.jurisdiction
over Oregon? We tend not to think of unoccupied land within the
lxrrders of an existing state as terra nullius. Accounts based on cur-
lcnt settlement would permit these occupiers to stay and even give
tlrem exclusive rights to determine the political destiny of the land
they've occupied. As Anna Stilz has argued, if the only rationale for
the acquisition ofjurisdictional rights is that land has been labored
ilpon, the state cannot have jurisdiction over undeveloped areas.aT
We need a way to distinguish ProPerty rights in the strict sense (the
right to control, use, and benefit from a particular resource) and
righx of jurisdiction (the right to make first-order rules rhar define
l)roperty rights and other rights and to interpret and enforce
lhose rules, as well as second-order rules about who holds juris-
rliction over what persons and resources). As Allen Buchanan has
irrgued, a compelling theory of territorial rights and boundaries
rnust distinguish between (1) jurisdicrional authority (the right to
rrrake, adjudicate, and enforce legal rules within a domain), (2)
ruetajurisdictional authority (the right to create and alter jurisdic-
tions, including geographic jurisdictions), and (3) property rights
ol' individuals and groups within jurisdictions.as I will return to
tlle property rights versus jurisdictional rights distinction later in
cxamining attempts to ground the state's right to control immigra-
tion in more literal interpretations of Locke's theory of property.
ll. Iieedom of Association
Some have defended the state's right to control immigration by
rrppealing to the value of freedom of association. Christopher
I leath Wellman makes such a case, beginning with the premise:
1. Legitimate states are entitled to political self-determination.
While he does. not provide a defense of the principle of politi-
r rrl self-determination, he emphasizes that the right of self-
rlctermination is owed to a group of people not merely in virtue of
tlreir standing as autonomous individuals but also in virtue of their
special group role or standing. For example, it would be wrong for
Sweden to forcibly annex Norway not only because doing so fails to
"the nation." So why should the collective entity of ,,the nation,,gain property rights over the territorT and nor tne particuta;;;l
viduals who actually performed the labor?
.Second, why is settlement alone a morally sufficient ground forprivate properry rights and rights of territorial jurisdiltion? TheLockean view is rhat productive use of rand is whJt g.r..u,.;t.giri-
mate entitlements to land. Locke himself famorrly"rrrgg.r,.J firu,
"nine tenths . . . nary . . . ninety_nine hundredths,; of ifre value of
"the products of the earth useiul to the rife of man,, is the resurtof human labor, ancl value_enhancing labor 
"po, p..rriorrrfyyl?ry"d land grounds a legitimate entitlement rtiL46 Miller andMeisels adopt this Lockean view in suggesting that members of thenation enhance rhe value of the lanJ"they work and build upon.But why should such acts entitle one to exclusive orrr..rt ip oi tfr.
land_ and not simply partial ownership proportional to the value
one has added? The more basic question is wtry productive use ofthe land and other resources should be the ,oi. o. primary basisfor generating rights to properry and rerritorial jurisdiction.A related third weakness of the quasi_Loclkean ,,settlemenr,,
1.9"T:"t, is its suggestion rhat ony groip that transfbrms the landis entitled to terrirorial 
.control, inltuaing over territory that anexistingstate already claims.territorial rigits over. For example, ifKorean immigrants in Los Angeles .orr#,r.t houses, restaurants,
1n{-monuments expressing their particular culture and call it Lit_tle,Korea, do they thereby acquire territorial rights over tfrat fie..of Los Angeles? Many of us would say that while Korean American,have a legitimate claim to private property rights over the fruitsof their labor, they do nor have territoriai rilfrts over the fartsof Los Angeles they have worked. The nationilist might ..r;;;;that immigrants reside and rabor in the national terriiory *iti, trr.existing nation's consent, and under the terms of that contract,their labor grounds a,claim to some property rights but not ter_
ritorial rights over the land they work. To mut . thls respons., ho*_evel nationalists would have to prioritize consent over the role of
value-enhancing labor in establishing a craim to territorial contror.Finally, Meisels and Miller do not explain why labor confers
rights of territoriar jurisd,iction over an entire territory rather than
simply rights of priuate-property. Imagine rhat a group of people
settle in an uninhabited part of Oregin and build"horr"r, ,ifroitr,
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new members, a group of fellow citizens is entitled to determine
whom (if anyone) to admit into their country.52
lior the very same reason an individual can reject a suitor, citizens
o{'a legitimate state can reject foreigners who seek to enter. Citi-
zcns have the presumptive right, Wellman argues, to "close doors
to all potential immigrants, even refugees desperately seeking asy-
lrrm from incompetent or corrupt political regimes that are either
rrnable or unwilling to protect their citizens' basic moral rights."53
Insofar as Wellman's argument relies on an analogy with mar-
liage, religious groups, and golf clubs, it is unconvincing. First, his
irnalogy runs together crucial differences between these associa-
tions and the political community. The latter is not an intimate or
srnall-scale association. I do not share a home, a place of worship,
or a sports club with all my compatriots. A political community is
typically large enough that I need not have intimate or regular
( ontact with citizens I do not know. Wellman acknowledges that
otrr interest in not being forced into association with others applies
rnost clearly in the case of intimate associations, but he maintains
tlrat this objection does not defeat the presumptive right of free
itssociation of large-scale associations, such as the state. To make
Iris case, Wellman draws on \Alhite's discussion of intimate and
rtligious associations, but on closer inspection, we see that what is
rrt stake for intimate and religious associations is unique to those
rrssociations and does not apply to the political community:
If the formation of a specific association is essential to the indi-
vidual's ability to exercise properly his,/her Liberties of conscience and
expression, or to his,/her ability to form intimate attachments, tt'er.
exclusion rules which are genuinely necessary to protect the asso-
ciation's primary purposes have an especially strong presumption
of legitimacy.5a
l'lre case for freedom of association rests in part on the nature of
tlrc associationls purpose. We respect freedom of association in the
rrrurital context because of the intimate purpose of such associa-
tions, and we respect freedom of association in the religious con-
l('xt on account of the expressive purpose of such associations. But
respect the individual autonomy of Norwegians but also because itfails to respect their special standing as Nor-wegian citizens: ,,their
collective achievement of maintairi"rg u political institution that
adequately protects the human rigfrdof at Norwegians."nn t wiitreturn to the importance of self-deiermination for a Jefense of the
state's right to control borders in the final section of the chapter_
wellman's defense of a state's right to control borders rests ontwo additional premises:
2. Freedom of association is an integral component of self_determination.
3. Freedom of association includes not only the right to
associate but also the right to dissociate.
The premise that freedom of association is a key part of self-determination is reflected in "the widespread conviction that eachof us enjoys a privileged position of moial dominion over our self_t..S-{i:_S_uftirs, a position which entirles us ro fieedom of associ_
ation."50 wellman argues that freedom of association includes boththe right to incruae and the right to excrudc potentiar associates,quoting Stuart \Alhite's discussion of freedom of association: ,,withthe freedom to associate, however, there comes the freedom torefuse association. \4rhe1 a group of people gets together to forman association of some kind (e.g., a ietigious association, a tradeunion, a sports club), they will frequenily wish to exclude somepeople from joining their association. \Ahat makes it. theirassocia_
,i"1, r-".I:g their purposes, is that they can exercise this ,right toexclude."'5r \^/hite's discussion centers on intimate 
""d ..f;i;;,associations within one political society.
wellman's innovation is to extend the value of freedom of asso-ciation to the state itself, arguing by way of analogy with small_scale
associations. We would.vehemently object if a girernm.";;g;;;;
were ro force an individual ro marry another against her will.iimi_larly, we would object if a golf club were forced to admit members
against its will. IIe concludes:
.Just as an individual may permissibly choose whom (if anyone) to
marry and a golf club may choose whom (if anyone) to admit as
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the liberal state is not an intimate association, nor is it straightfor-
warlI1 an expressive associarion. As sarah Fine has argued]whilethe liberal state is committed to certain values (e.g.,"toleration,
equality before the law, and individual liberty), thJre is reason_
able disagreement about the basic list and ranking of such values.s5Even if there were consensus on a list and rankiig, adherence to
such values is not sufficient to suggest that the statels an expressive
association of the kind religious associations are-namely, associa-tions committed to and expressive of comprehensive rerigious and
moral doctrines.
Wellman acknowledges that freedom of association for groupsthat are "intimate or related to, liberty of conscienc. u.ra &p.J._
sion" is especially varuabre, but he argues that fieedom of associa-tion should not be restricted to thesJ contexts. To make his case,he offers another analogy, this time between the golf club ana the
state:
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gol['clubs, the burden rests on proponents of the free association
nlgument to elaborate why freedom of association remains so fun-
rlirrnental for states even if citizens will rypically never have any-
tlring approaching face-to-face relations with the vast majority of
Ircr compatriots. Wellman suggests two reasons. First, the sheer size
ol the group dramatically shapes the experience of being a mem-
lx'r. For example, as a private golf club increases its membership,
llrt:re will be more wear and tear on the golf course. Similarly, as
n 1;olitical state increases the number of new members, citizens'
liv<:s will be affected by population density. This concern about
"wcar and tear" associated with increased membership depends on
rtrrpirical considerations, and it does not deliver a principled.justi-
lication for a state's right to control its own borders.
A second reason has to do with the power to shape the associa-
lion's future. Control over rules of admission and membership are
rignificant in part because new members will subsequently have a
riry in how the association is organized. Members have a say not
orrly in determining future membership but also in determining
thc future course of the association more generally, including
rlccisions about "the host state's cultural make-up, the way its econ-
r rrrry functions, and/ or how its political system operates." Wellman
crnphasizes that it is this connection between a group's member-
rlrip and its future direction that underscores why freedom of asso-
li:rtion is "such an integral component of self-determination."58
Wcllman's point about the state's "cultural make-up" brings him
n'rnarkably close to Walzer's and Miller's views, which I find
ttttpersuasive for reasons discussed earlier. Wellman is on to some-
tlring when he raises the future direction of how the political sys-
l('rn operates, but I think developing this point requires elaborat-
rrrg the connection between self-determination and democracy.
A democratic association is a distinctive tlpe of association, and
I llelieve a more compelling case for the state's right to control
lrorders can be found by examining the conditions of democratic
lrssociation.
A second major weakness of Wellman's argument is the absence
ol any explicit justification for the state's jurisdictional rights over
its territory of which the right to control immigration is a part. He
lrlurs together the right to exclude those who want to be admitted
ro citizenship or poli.tical membership and the right to exclude those
If no one doubts that golf clubs have a presumptive right to exclude
others, then there seems no reason to suspect that a group of citi_
zens cannot also have the right to freedom of association, even if
control over membership in a country is not nearly as significant as
control regarding one,s spouse.E6
But the politicar community is distinct from a gorf club in at leasttwo morally important respects. First, the state is not a voluntary
association. Most of us live and die in the countries we are born cit-izens of. This lack of voluntariness to political m...rb..rfrip .ulr.,the stakes of membership. Exclusio, i.or, a particular state canbe hurgely consequential in a way that exclusion from a golf clubtipically is not.57 outsiders have significant interests iri becom_ins members, and exclusion brings lrigh .ort, (and. not just costs
associated with expressive or intimate purposes) to nonmembers.Another reason that' a srate is different fiom a gorf crub is that
states don't exist in a competitive environment conducive to mar-ket entrants. If a golf club iefuses to admit me, I can form my ownorjoin another. If a state refuses to admit me, I can neither form
my own nor easilyjoin another.
In light of these crucial disanalogies between the state and
small-scale associations such as 
-u..I.g., religious groups, and
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who want to be admitted to the state's territorl. But there are dis-tinctive considerations that apply to justifying the state,s .igt t iocontrol rhe movement of peopre into and witf,in itr t...ito.ylco.r-
sider again the case of golf ilrrbr. Arr.rring a golf club has theright of ownership over a parcel of land, ctuU mlmters have not
only the presumptive right to exclude outsid.ers from admissionto club membership but also the right to exclude outsiders from
entering and using the club,s proplrty. Club memb..r, ur.;oirr,
owners of the club, have the right ro control club property W"if_
man implies a similar ownership-based account of territoriai rights
of the political community when he says: "My right to freedori of
movement does not enti.tl3 
-me 
to enter your hJuse without yourpermission so why think this right gives me a valid claim toenter a foreign country without thaf country,s permissionr"* Jilas an-individual property owner is entitled to exclude outsijersfrom his house, members of a country are entitled to exclude out_
siders from entering the country. Weliman,s analogy runs togettrer
tw9 tlpes of rights thar need ro be distinguished, lrivat. p.ip..ryrights and rights of territorial jurisdictiJn.6o Territoriar rr'*n.I;;.distinctive to states, and analogies with private property rights do
not get us very far.
C. Property
Another defense of the state's right to control immigration appealsto the concept of property. These arguments draw literally ,utfr..thal m.etaphorically upon Locke,s thfory of property and political
authority. we can distinguish individualist and coilectivist iockean
theories of territorial rights.
Consider first the ind,iuid,ualist Lockean account. According toLocke's well-known theory of properry the right to p.iuat. piof_
erty is viewed as a natural, p..poiiti.ul right.-Lock"'U.gi^ f.oilthe theological premise trraicoa gave thelarth ro humankind in
common and argues that individuals come to hold private prop_
erty rights in particular parcels of land in virtue of ,.*irrgifr.i.labor with and adding value to that land.6r How does n.-_ou.from a group of individuals with a natural right of priva,. p.op..f
over parcels of land to the collective entity of the state with territo-
rial rights over land and people? The answer is Locke,s theorv of
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llrr: social contract: individual property owners make a voluntary
ngreement with one another in order to form a state with territo-
t'irrljurisdiction. It is on the basis of voluntary consent that individ-
trll properfy owners give up their rights ofjurisdiction over their
l,roperty to the state. It is worth quoting Locke at length here:
Every man, when he at first incorporates himself into any common-
wealth, he, by uniting himself thereunro, annexed also, and submits
to the community, those possessions, which he has, or shall acquire,
that do not already belong to any other government: for it would
be a direct contradiction, for any one to enter into society with oth-
ers for the securing and regulating ofproperty; and yet to suppose
his land, whose property is to be regulated by the laws of the soci-
ety, should be exempt from the jurisdiction of that government, to
which he himself, the proprietor of the land, is a subject. By the
same act therefore, whereby any one unites his person, which was
before free, to any commonwealth, by the same he unites his pos-
sessions, which were before free, to it also; and thq become, both of
them, person and possession, subject to the goaernment and dominion of that
common-uealth, as long as it hath a being.62
lndividual property owners not only enter into an agreement about
tlle control and use of their respective bundles of property but also
t'nter into a contract to transfer to tt.:,e state jurisdictional rights con-
lained in their bundle of property rights, including rights of law-
rnaking, enforcement, and adjudication of disputes. On Locke's
ir(:count, the state's jurisdictional rights are derived from individu-
irls' prepolitical property rights by way of their free consent.
There are several problems with the individualistic Lockean
lrccount.63 First, on the Lockean account, a piece of land can
lrccome subject to the state's authority onlyvia the consent of indi-
vidual property owners, but some individuals occupying a state's
tt:rritory have not consented to its authority. There will be pock-
cts of anarchists who have actively refused consent to the state's
rruthority, yet continuity of territorial jurisdiction is necessary for
the uniform application of the law, which in turn is necessary for
government to fulfill its aims.
The way Lockeans have dealt with this problem is to assume
cither that jurisdiction is already continuous or that there are
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strong incentives for anarchists to submit to the state's authority.Robert Nozick famousty adopred ,h; ;;;;"; move, a move that isultimately unpersuasive:
l{e have discharged our task of explaining how a state would arisefrom a shte of nature without urrytrr.,, 
.ighr, U"irrg violated. Themoral objections of the individualist uru..ti., to the minimar stateare overcome. It is not an unjust imposition of a monopoly; thedefacto monopoly grows by an invisibie_h;;;;;?#:
ally permissible means, without anyone,s rights being violated andwithout any claims being made to a special igtrt tfrut others do notpossess.6a
How exactly does this work? The anarchist,s objection is that thestate's claim to a monopoly on the rr. of fbrce within the state,sterritory violates her. rights not onry n..u.,r. the state claims tobe the exclusive holdeiof the ,ighi,"olir,.n and exac repara_tions bur also because it forces frJ, ,.pi/tor prorection rhat shey","ld rather provide herself. Nori.t'.riuintains that anarchists(whom he also calls ,,indep.ra.rt ;j 
_orr'U. compelled to jointhe state voluntarily in excilange fo.'uJ.q,ru,e compensation forthe loss ol- utiliry they experienie by havirlg to join. Adopring theconcept of compensation from weriare ecJnomics, he argues thattaking autonomy away from tfr. irra.p.rJ.rrts is justified by givingsecurity to those who vo.luntarilyjoined tfr.-rtut.. The appropriateprice of compensation is the u*Lrr, ifrat wouta return indepen_dents'utility to what it was befor. th;;;
i"U:,1,.:::.lTltl!,,rG;{,,ffi trlJffi ;.Tfl :,1,:i.:1i:il:selves, the state woull determine , ,*;;';; #"1;:;T#-cess, based on interpersonal compa.iroJ, ura trade_offs betweenthe needs of indeoendents and ,t. ,..a, of everyone else.65 Butthis move is r,ulnerable to.,fr. u".y on:.".,i"" Nozick makes againstutilitarianism: it fails ro take the rightJ 
"i.*r, and every individualseriously' Nozick's craim that indi#auars who initialry refuse to givetheir consent to the r
someadequ,,.*,*_r'iili;l;::"?;ff li:[:"#,,1iiu:::;fJ
rights of the independents.
A.second problem with individualistic Lockean accounts of astate's territorial rights is that they urrr_" , piece of land, once
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rrrbjected to the state's authority, is perpetuatly subjected. Individu-
irls give up not only their jurisdictionalauthority (the right to make,
r:nforce, and adjudicate legal rules within a domain) but also their
metajurisdictional authority (the right to create or alter jurisdic-
tions, including geographic jurisdictions). While it is the original
llarties to the social contract who give up both qpes of rights, the
ilgreement is taken to be binding on all future generations. But
this assumption is at odds with Locke's own claim that individuals
irre by nature "all equal and independent."66
Hillel Steiner has taken Locke's "all equal and independent',
claim very seriously, arguing that individuals do indeed retain
tnet{urisdictional authority and thereby have the right to exit the
ntate with their property whenever they wish. As he puts it, ,,pre-
cisely because a nation's territory is legitimately composed of the
tr:al estate of its members, the decision of any of them to resign
llrat membership and, as it were, to take their real estate with them
is a decision that must be respected."67 The problem, of course, is
lhat Steiner's solution requires us to abandon any conception of
tr:rritorial rights as securing stable borders within which a state has
lr legitimate monopoly on the use of force and the right to estab-
lish justice.os One might reject Steiner's approach and instead
ittterpret Locke as saying that a social contract that does not bind
lirture generations would fail to live up to the primary purpose for
which the political community was created: "for their comfortable,
s;t['e, and peaceable living one amongst another, in a secure enjoy-
ttrent of their properties."6e If each new member of every genera-
lion could secede if she wanted to, the political community could
trot last. Yet, if we take seriously Locke's insistence on the equal
lir:edom of each individual, it is hard not to conclude that the(individualist) Lockean account of territorial rights fails to pro-
virle convincing reasons for believing a state's rights ofjurisdiction
ll ump an individual's right to equal freedom.
These difficulties with individualist Lockean accounts get at a
rlt:cper problem. In attempting to derive a state's territorial rights
lirrm individual property rights, they conflate private property
r ights with jurisdictional rights. Like the quasi-Lockean narional-
ist theories, individualist Lockean theories jump from the rights
gcnerally conferred by properry ownership to the much wider set
ol 
.jurisdictional and metajurisdictional rights claimed by states.
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t'otrception of property that he takes as encompassing both pri
vl(e property rights and territorial rights. He begins with the idea
ol self-determination, arguing that the right of a group to be self-
tlt:termining can be justified by reference to "the group's ownership
ol goods produced through the labor and contribution of mem-
lrt:rs." He calls this the "associative ownership" view. Pevnick takes
llrc basic Lockean intuition-that we are entitled to the fruits of
otrr labor so long as it does not harm others-to explain why we
would allow a voluntary association to make its own decision about
lls future. Members of the association have produced something
llrat would not have existed but for their labor, and this justifies
Ittcmbers' claim to make decisions about the future of the associa-
lion, including whom to admit as future members.T2
By adopting a broad conception of property, Pemick seeks to
rltow that the Lockean intuition underlying an individual's or a
voluntary association's claims to ownership can be extended to
tkt,tes, eyert though the latter are nonvoluntary intergenerational
tussociations. People are born into particular states and simply find
llrcmselves subject to the coercive power of the state in whose ter-
t'itory they happen to reside. Pemick, nonetheless, maintains the
plausibility of viewing citizens as 'Joint owners" of state institutions,
flrralogous to owners of the family farm:
Like the family farm, the construction of state institutions is a his-
torical project that extends across generations and into which indi-
viduals are born. Just as the value of a farm very largely comes from
the improvements made on it, so too the aalue of membership in a
state is uu1 large\ a result of the labor and, inuestment of the communitl.
The citizenry raises resources through taxation and invests those
resources in valuable public goods: basic infrastructure, defense,
the establishment and maintenance of an effective market, a system
of education, and the like . . . these are goods that only exist as a
result of the labor and investment of community members.Ts
ln contrast to Nine, Pelrrick argues it is the labor of india,id,uals in
llr.eirrok as cit'izens, not simply "the state," that grounds the claim of
ioint ownership over public institutions. Like Miller and Meisels,
It:vnick invokes Locke's labor theory of value to ground a state's
tcrritorial righs, but he differs from them in steering clear of the
Take the example of my backyard. Because I own my backyard, Ican exclude people from entering it, but my property ownershipis insufficient to determine who tas the right to make the rulesgoverning my backyard as well as yours.
Does a collectiaist Lockean thelry of territorial rights fare bet_ter? While the Lockean argument for territorial righ; hm q,er;ll;been understood as u, uiol,-..i ahn,r, n,.
.a-- NT:-^ -, .,1, .gY*ent bout private propertF iight ,Cara Nine argues that therl ir ro ..uro, ,t;;;;5;."ffi:, i"J:ean argument for territorial rights cannot also be made. u.. rt.m_
egy. is to argue by analogy between an individual,, p."p..ry-.;;;
and a state's territorial rights: the state acquire, t..rito.iul .ifi;, i;
.th9 same way that individuals acquire p.op...y righrs. The theorvis "collectivisr" because it claims tha, ifr.^*ii..iir;;; ;i":state can directly acquire rights to land without prior reference toproperty rights or individual consent. on Nine,s account, 
"" ";.;;
::"?,:,9i'j:,li*111,) i1i ganauJe of changing rhe land. tn"fficreating a relationship with ir, and (2) the relationship is morally
valuable in terrns of the Lockean principles of Ute.ry,?.r;;;;;;
efficiency' The rerevant agent in her acctunt of te.ritoriar 
.igiri, i,the state, not individual citizens or the nation.
Not just-any act upon the land will do; only morally valuableacts upon the land generare a- legitimate right io it. Nirie .*;;
sizes the state's morally valuable iot. ir, ,,uii.rg, irt..p..ti.rg,;;d
enforcing property law, which is integral to def,rmini"g lr".;'f;;dis developed, and its rol.e 1 establi"shing and maintai"nid;.;kets, which create value. in land and p.oirr.* deriving from theland' The state's territorial rights are justified for the same reasona person's property rights are: ,,becairse, on Lockean u.g.r_.rr,r,they help to realize the values of liberty, desert 
""a .inli.".y:;i,First, a system of state territorial ,ignt, i, ,,the best way to p.ol".,and promote liberty,,, since individ"ual liberty requires ..a physical
space where the people,s values can be brought to bear.,, Ti.,rtut.
also has a moral claim to the land based on iire principl. .f d;;;;;because the state is ,,a unique and significant author of the land,s
Tl":." Finally, a state system of territorial rights can make mostefficient use of the lancl-7r
Ryan Pevnick also adopts a collectivist Lockean approach
w_ith an explicit focus on the issue of immigration. In contrast toNine's argument by direct analogy, pevnici< adopts a very broad
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llte consent of individual members or by making certain meta-
physical assumptions about the nature of the state? For example,
lrr considering the implications of "associative ownership" for
krng-term unauthorized migrants, Pevnick implicitly relies on the
trlle of consent. A person's contributions to the maintenance of
prrblic institutions are not enough; the consent of existing mem-
lrt:rs seems to be necessary. As he puts it, "In the case of illegal
Itumigrants, by entering the country illicitly such individuals took
llrcir place in their community without the consent of the citi-
zt:nry." \Alhile he acknowledges that unauthorized migrants make
contributions through working and paying taxes, he contends that
litizens have no obligation "to pass ownership of their institutions
to illegal immigrants" because the migrants have "put themselves
itr this situation without the consent of the citizenry."16 Pevnick's
n:liance on consent in the treatment of unauthorized migrants
Itveals that there is more to the claim about self-determination
than simply claims about ownership through value-enhancing
lirl>or and fair exchange. By viewing claims ofjurisdiction as a kind
ol'property claim, Pevnick's account obfuscates what is distinctive
ru I xrut territorial j urisdiction.
Third, Permick does well to draw on the idea of self-
tk:termination, but his ownership account leaves unanswered
Ittrportant questions about the nature of self-determination. He
vicws the right to self-determination as the right to democratic self-
rlctermination: the right of individual members to have an equal
*ry in the making of the laws to which they are subject. Pevnick
tr'lies on an analogy between the state and voluntary associations,
lrrrt voluntary associations rely on a range of decision-making pro-
r'r'dures. For example, a student group or the Rotary Club may
nrake decisions democratically, but a religious organization or a
Irrrsiness may concentrate decision-making power in the hands
ul one or a few. This suggests that collective ownership claims of
rncmbers support a right to self-determination that is consistent
wit.h a range of decision-making procedures, only some of which
rnay be democratic. Another way of putting it is this: the fact of
lollective ownership alone cannot entail a right to democratic self-
r lt't.ermination.?7 Our intuitions about collective ownership suggest
tlr:tt owners are entitled to some say in decisions regarding their
lollective property, but not necessarily an equal say.
idea of the nation in favor of individual citizens. In virtue of theiraggregate labor, individual citizens help to create and maintainpublic goods and institutions, thereby *i"'** a right ofjoinr or.r
:j,1fi"L.::*-,*::-:l* ownership il;'^ grounding a craito "at leasr some discretion.in makilg;;;;;;:ffiilffi1ilT
those resources will be used,,, i".f"aiig r"h.th". urd to whom rhegood ofmembership will be given in ttie future.rn
^ 
Anticipating the objection"that fri, "u.ro.,
.,f , .tr*j," 
-.i. ,^ 
- 
-- 
tatrve ownership"o a state's right to control immigration bil;";";.-,h..Iiir;j#:::iill:^rr.*,.-,t"" and rightJ 
"r p.iru,. properry, pevnii*:,"L1.^1*T,hil we cann o t" "" a. ^,I" i 
- ;."; #;o r;#ffiIjurisdiction as a kind of private p.of..-ry ,t.ictly construed. H
*:tf:-1t,j*T1 1, ,r,. u",r,t.i,ilo,udmi.,i,ter a sysrem orights, including privare. p-loperty rigirts, ,'ilr,;;.jiu;iiilii:,],]
f::: TiTTi"t thar jurisdic,ion .u,irritt'be understood as a claimabout property writ tirge. Following J.;fi Waldron, h. aefir.J"properry'' o. "o*.,..rtip', as a d;;i;;* for ,.rures that gov_ern people's access to and contro-l of things,,, such as frra, 
"r,i."f#?il.ii:i: :^.,"T of prod uc ti or,, urd lrunufac rured goods, aswell as (for some) ideas, inventions, and ;;;;ffi;,1._i#ri;i
ucts. So when he calls someon. u.r',.o*r"r,, of a resource, he istiTpJy sa)4ng rhat she has some t.r.rai" oi,lghts over it, and rhetask is to elaborate th
lf atwe*;;iJ;;;:,:;;;;;;:rff..:-,T:;,;nff ;tr:1#r.:community as a whole determines how important resources are to
i-:::: 1n_:::-9.*.minations are made o., trr. basis of th. ,o.iuiinterest through mechanisms of .oif..tiue decision_muf.i.rfanythine from a leisurely debate among tfre .ta.., of a tribe to theforming and implem",ti.,g of u Sorri.t_itytJ,riu._V"ur plan.,,,7EThere are several majoi difficulties witrr per,nick,s and Nine,scollectivist Lockean 3c:olnts. First, they blur together privateproperty rights and iurisdictionar rights,'a point I have alreadvbelabored. The seco"nd problem r,rr'ro-al ;il" ;;';.;;,,llli3between the collective enliry of ..the r,ur.,,u.ra irr;rril;H.i:or "owners'" why shourd the co,ective entity of the state gain juris-dictional rights over the territory 
""i;;;;" parricular individu_als who actually performed the tbo; ur-"g.rr,, of the srate? Howdo we-get from an aggregation of individ"ual property owners tothe collective entity witfr;:urisaictionui 
.igi r, if not by requiring
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How, then, do the collective ownership claims of citizens gener_ate a specific risht to democraticserr-deteimination? r.r,,r.r.?rigt t
ffilr"Y ll.:, ::.::nip claims "r .i ii^^'"ver public ins ti tutionsln.I nr:p"ilt are speiiat urra tn* gi*;;#".i;;ffi?#::cratic self-derermination, but this U.-g, ,h; qrestion of how thatright is to bejustified.
III. THs Varur or Srrr_nnrERMrNATroN
AND A Druocnarrc.|usrrrrcarroN
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rl;rtes rest on the consent of their members. . . . [G]iven a gen-
rrirrc'contract'it makes sense to say that the territorial integrity
,rrrrl political sovereignty can be defended in exactly the same
rv;ry as individual life and liberty."B0 If one adopts a contractarian
,rpproach, the state's right to self-determination comes to rest on
tlr('autonomy of individuals-in particular, the freedom to associ-
,rtc with others in the pursuit of collective ends. As Charles Beitz
prrts it, "The liberty of states is a consequence of the liberty of per-
rorrs to associate."Br As we saw in discussing Wellman's defense of
tlrc state's right to control immigration, the familiar problem is
tlr:rt there are few, if any, governments that are genuinely free asso-
r rrrtions, constituted by the actual consent of all citizens. Indeed,
,,rrly a small subset of citizens, including immigrants who become
rr,rttrralized citizens, have actually given their consent. As numer-
,,rrs critics have argued, territorial states are not voluntary asso-
r irrtions. People do not freely create, join, and exit them. Most
ol the world's people (roughly 97 percent) live out their lives in
tlrt' countries they happened to be born citizens of. One might
rcsPond by acknowledeing that states are not free associations
rvlrile also maintaining that state institutions derive their legiti-
rrr:rr:y from periodic affirmation via elections or acts of "tacit con-
rlnt." Drawing on Locke, one might argue that by not exiting the
tclritory of the state into which I was born or by not participating
lr political dissent, I tacitly consent to the state's authority. The
;,r'oblem with this response is that state institutions define the pro-
r lsses through which consent can be expressed, and it is these very
trslitutions-to which we have not consented-that stand in need
, rl jrrstification.
A third way of understanding self-determination is as deriva-
trvc of more fundamental principles, such as principles ofjustice.
Itcitz calls this the idea of a "hlpothetical contract": a government
rr lt:sitimate if it uould be consented to by rational persons sub-
l('( t to its rule.82 The argument for respecting a state's right to self-
rlctcrmination is that interference with this right would violate
1rr irrciples of jr.rstice that id,eal, not actual, citizens would endorse
r,'garding the terms of their association. On this account, we
,,lrould respect a state's sovereignty and refrain from interfering in
rts irffairs because the state's institutions are just, on some concep-
tiorr of justice. Intervention is justified only if the state is unjust
11-1?.n* way to justifi.the state,s right to conrrol immigration is aspart of a more general right of deriocratic sef_determination of apeople. The idea of seH_Jetermi"utio, 
,tu.rds for the propositionthat members of a co_llective n", 
"-p* ir"ro right ro make rheirown decisions abour the policies p-_rlgri"a in rheir name. Self_determination is a claim ibo.rt r.lf-.rrle- ir.ierty examine differentaccounts of the idea of self-determination to set the stage for ademocratic. jusrifi cation of a sta te,s .rfi;;;;""trol immigration.First, on a holistic account of self_ietermination, states are saidto have the right of self_deter*i"ution fr..ar
are morar ..,t-iti". with the *p;;i;;; 
'"J;'J [1[',J]f.::T1l:pursuit of ends. As discussed earlier, tru, J., is reflected in Wolffand Vattel's arsumenm for the 
"""1",..r."iion principle in inter_national law, which is based on an 
";;; between individualsand nations:
Nations are regarded as individual free persons living in a state ofnature. 
. . . Since by nature all nations u.e eqrul, since moreover allmen are equal in a mqrll sense whose rights ana obligations are thesame; the rights and obligations of all nations are also by nature thesame,78
The problem here is that.states qua states do not think or act inpursuit of ends. Onlv individ,rut p.opt.-lo. p..hup, all sentientbeings) think or act, Jithe. ut"r.;i;;;";;r.^ Much more needsto be said about rhe idea of ,fr. ,rr,. l! u ]o.uf entity before thisview can be persuasive.
,- ,1::.o"O yiy ?l.qp.:aching a stare,s right to self_determinationrs rn terms of ind,ividu,al conseni. As Walzer"suggests, ..The riehts of
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lrrrrrlrrrnental right of all peoples.86 The idea of a universal right of
rlll rk:termination is further enunciated in the International Cov-
r r,urt on Civil and Political Rights, which states, "All peoples have
tlrl right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely
rllto rnine their political status and freely pursue their economic,
r,,r i;rl and cultural development."sT
Wc can build on the idea of self-determination to develop an
,rltr.lrrative, democratic justification for a state's right to control
trrrrrrigration. My argument consists of the following claims:
l. A people/demos has the right of self-determination.
ll. 'fhe right of self-determination includes the right to con-
trol admission and membership.
:t.'fhe demos should be bounded by the territorial boundar-
ies of the state.
I . (litizens of a territorial state, in virtue of their role as members
of the (territorially defined) demos, have the right to control
admission and membership.
I lrriefly elaborate each of these claims in the following.
\ \ I)eople/Demos Has the Right of Self-Determination
I lris is the idea of popular sovereignty: that a group of people (the
rllrrros) ought to have independent political control over signifi-
'.url zrspects of its common life. As a concept in international law,
rrll:tletermination was seen to apply only to specific territories
(lrrst, the defeated European powers; later, the overseas trust ter-
rtr)r'ies and colonies) and was understood primarily as a right of
i, ( ('ssion. It has evolved to be understood as a right of all peoples
trr prrrticipate in democratic processes of governance.8s The claim
, rl sclF-determination need not be understood solely as a claim for
lrrll political independence or autonomy; it is a claim for some
rrrrk'pendent political control over significant aspects of its com-
rrrorr life. Self-determination implies an independent domain of
;,,,lilical control, but it leaves open the domain of control (what
',,rrts of activities and institutions the group controls) , the extent
,,1 ils control overvarious items in the domain, and the particular
and interference would promote the development ofjusttic institutions.
,Yet, one.troubling feature of this third approach is that it vieself-determination as
cnmatlai-^ i'^+.-j+:--^r- 1 mere means to justice, failing to captuso ething intuitively imporrant about self-determiriation. consider an example provided by Beitz:
Country A is an imperial country and area B, a territorially distinct
area with generally accepted boundaries, is A,s colony. Since A isthe most benevolent of all possible imperial countries, there is no
reason to think that granting independence to B will decrease the
amount of social injustice in B; indeed, the opposite seems morelikely because of various political and economic complications
inside B which we don,t need to explain. Nonetheless, the residents
of B, in a fair and free election, overwhelmingly indicate their pref_
erence for national independence.Bg
On Beitz's account of self_determination, which views self_determination as derivatively important in terms of its contribu-tions to justice, country A should^ resist the resurts of the election
3:d ::f":. to grant area B independence. Beirz responds that
"intuitively, this seems implausible,,, and yet he ultimately con_
:l:q.t that this response is ..weaker than it may seem,, b;.;;;.it "simply does not apply to many real world cases.,,Sa But what ifit did? If a benevoleniimperial powe, like country A could do abetter job ensuring substantively just outcomes, we would haveto oppose B's move for independence on Beitz,s view we needto account for the independent value of self-deter*irutior, 
.r..,while recognizing that ii may serve as an important component ofjustice.
^ I 
*T, to suggest that self-determination is not only an elementofjustice; it is also a part of an ideal of d,emocracy. '-fhe democratir-principle of sellderermination srands for the p."p"rf r"r;;, ;g.?."p of people has the right to make its own decisions abourpolicies made in its name. Selidetermination is a claim about self-rule' In internationar law, the right of self-determination is under-
.,?"9 u: the right of a people 1o determine its collecriu. poiitl
5{.a;_stiny through democraric means.B5 The first article of theuN charteq signed in 1g4b, declares self-determination to be a
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political institutions by which the group exercises control over idomain.se
for an accounr of self_deter-irrutlori ;; ;;;;;';'";H#TI:
self-determination.
. 
Turning to moral and political theory a more minimalistinterpretation of the right of ,.ff_a.t.._i.
to sonxesay in the makiig or the ,;i""J:ffiilT::t,l'.i#.-l:For example, one mi.qht io.r, o., u..or.,,usitiry rather ,rr""".irrrrights of parricipation, identifting. ,. gr;1.,r,-,an does, rhree [ea-tures that make up u T"... minimll conception.f d.;;;;;;,i;)represenhtive majorilarian institutions for making 
_or, g.,.r..i
31i" 
"'t.Lln.I : :,:?Tteten 
r i n d ividuat is excr uded from pa rtici_pation," (2) the highest government 
"ffi.i;i;-;;;;;;;;#':;the people try being subjeit to removal i.o_ om.., and (3) thereare institutionally secured freedoms of speech, association, andassembly, which are required fo. .euroribly free deliberation.erOn a more demanding interpretation of self_determination, whatis required are equal,lgt t, oi pu.ti.ipuiJ, in the governing pro_cesses. For example, Thomas ch.irtiuro defends th"e idea 
"F.;:i:r.:.ludl8 "an equal say,, in determining the mosr fundamen_
i:i ry:,':j*] l, Il,: ^T:1.. demandin g in tJ.p,. tation is required
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prrrrr iple). There are differentviews aboutwhatitis aboutpersons
llr,rt is to receive equal respect (e.g.,whether it is the well-being/
llorl of persons or the autonomy of persons that is the proper
nlr;t'r'l of equal consideration), which we need not settle here. The
rnrrrrrl equality principle is the most common justification offered
llr lxsic human rights, rights whose violation poses the most seri-
,rtr lhreat to the individual's chances of living a decent human life.
I lrl lamiliar list of basic human rights includes the right to life,
tlrc light to security of the person, the right against enslavement
rrr(l t()rture, and the right to resources for subsistence, among oth-
il r, More controversially, the case can be made that respecting the
lr,,r;rl equality of persons also requires recognition of the right
trr rlt'rnocratic governance. Equal consideration requires that all
p('rs()ns be regarded as equal participants in significant political
rllr isions to which they are subject. The right to democracy is an
lrnl,( )r'l-ant element of the institutional recognition of the equality
, rl lrt't sons.
l,lvcn if one rejects the idea of a human right to democratic gov-
r nriurce, there are instrumental reasons for recognizing the right
t, r r lt'nrocracy as a legal aspiration in international law Democratic
ll'r\('r'nance is of such great instrumental value for the protection
,,1 lrrrrnan rights that it ought to be required for any government
trr lrt'r'onsidered legitimate. Evidence in support of this argument
tr ,,\rrrartya Sen's work showing famines are much less likely in
,lrrrrot:racies, as well as the "democratic peace" literature that sug-
Hr'\ts (lemocracy is the most reliable form of government for secur-
lrg lx)ace, which should lessen the violation of human rights.e3
I lrcst' arguments support the case for understanding the right of
rr ll rlt'termination as a right to democratic governance.
lt I hr Right of Self-Determination Includes the Right to Control
l, I ttr i l;sion and Membership
I lrc r ight of selldetermination of a people is the right to indepen-
r[ rrt political control over significant aspects of its common life.
\,, l,'r't'derick \Alhelan puts it, "The admission of new members into
tlr,'rlt'rnocratic group. . . would appear to be such a matter, one
tlr,rt ( ()uld not only affect various private interests of the current
rrnrl)crs, but that could also, in the aggregate, affect the quality
, 
\4rha1 are the grounds of the right of democratic self_determination? To inticipate the objeion that democratic serf-determination is inhererily irr.o,,,putinf 
. ritf, respecting individ_yal lrulan rights, it is important to see that serf-determination canbe derived from the r; ; ;;; il;' :; : j':il ::.,,1,j#, 1",;.";',1 il : H}:i :;l".i,f
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of their public life and the character of their community.,,e4
zer goes even further: .Admission and exclusion u.. u, ih.ol co.11unal independence. They suggesr the deepesr meanof selCdetermination.'.e5 I agree *itt t'f,"-Ursic claim made hby \A4relan and Walzer trut fart wuy, *iif, Wulr* on the *.orrlfor self-determination. In my ui.r, tn. right of self-determinatioderives not out of a carr-r."., ,^'--^"^-?:" "^ """ ULLLr','dLr('l
:1T,:T,ii:f iTi+-.^T[rl,J?"il:i?:._".9:]:[.,;JTillof individuals ro be .:g..ld..d as equal p..;6;;r;:#;r.:;political decisions to which they are bound.
C. The Demos Shoukl Be Bountled, by the Territorial Bound.aries ofthe State
This is a controversial craim, which I have defended in anoth
ff:rr-i::li.':l ] can only briefly summarize here.e6 r b"si; ;ithe normative requirements of a"-o..u.y. "A';;;.r- ;;ilJ:
ill1j.::::y,:^:h",.it is rule by rhe p.opr. who regard onanother as equals. \Ahat is required io _.Lt ,t i, a"_urra.oi.q,
regard? The idea of equality might enter a theory of democ.a,at different levels: at the level of iormative;"rrin.J,i"";;"J
level of institutional rlesign'e7 A more .o*11.* view of democracvdifferentiates between no"rmative j urrifi *;i;;;";;;;#;;
requirements of democracy. As a- matter ofjustification, the ideaof equality places limits on the sorts of reasons that may be givento explain why we should accept one rather than anothe. .oi..o-tion of fair rerms of democraiic participati"".'i, i, tfr;;#';r*;
::::f :: !:titicat equatity.ro connect tt. ,,o._uttve justification
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\^rith the institutional requirements of democracy. political eoraritvis a constitutive condition of democracv. pol. . '. -.'":**"'.i
pro r ecti ng ce rrai n .q ;;i' ;n 
"' 
;", iii;" *,' :1 ;:il'PJ,XH.Jthe equal worlh of these rights and liberties by providirg 
"q;;iopportunities for political influence.
The realization of political equality depends on the existence ofa stable bounded demos. The modern ,or. d.*u..ur., ,r.n u rtu_ble demos. The boundaries of ttre a.r.ros ure already demarcatedaccording to the boundaries of state membership, ;;r;;;;;;ment is not that we should accept the state system because it is the
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I rr lrounding the demos according to the territorial boundaries of
rt;rtt's. \Arhat are these democratic reasons?
liirst, it is a historically contingent but morally relevant fact that
lltl tnodern state is the primary instrument for securing the sub-
ttrtrrliue rights andfreedoms constituti,ae of democraq.Without the state,
trrrlividuals will disagree about what rights they have and when
tiglrts are violated. Even if individuals agree on what rights they
Ir,rvr', some people may not respect those rights without a com-
rrrorr third-party enforcer. A state system of public law establishes
rr r r )lr)mon view of the rights of individuals, and it has the coercive
lrrirns to enforce that view. The state also provides institutions for
'rrlirrrlicating conflicts among individuals. In short, the institutions
rrl llrt: modern state serve legislative, executive, and judicial func-
ttons necessary for the creation and maintenance of the system of
r lglrts, including rights of participation.es
A second reason for bounding the demos according to the
lrr11111f211ss of the territorial state has to do with solidari$. -the
rt,rlc is not simply an instrument of decision making or a means
tl sr,< uring rights; it is also a key site of solidarity, trust, and par-
tir iplrtion. Democratic participation happens not in a vacuum but
ll rt'littion to a rich network of institutions. Trust plays an indis-
;rnrs:rble role here. As Charles Tilly has argued, trust "consists of
pl,rt irrg valued outcomes at risk of others' malfeasance, mistakes,
lr llriltrres." Trust relationships are those in which people regularly
lrrkr such risks. Tiust is more likely among a group of people who
r nrrrc together repeatedly within a stable infrastructure of institu-
t!rr15 11n6 who share a sense of solidarity rooted in a shared politi-
r ,rl lrrlture. To the degree that individuals integrate their trust net-
rlor ks into political institutions, the greater the stake people have
Ir r t l rc successful functioning of those institutions. As Tilly puts its,
trrrlivi<luals "acquire an unbreakable interest in the performance
,,1 Flovcrnment. The political stakes matter."ee A shared political
,lltur'(: based on common citizenship is crucial for fostering trust
,rrrr I solidarity, which in turn enables democratic participation.
,\ tlrird reason for bounding the demos according to the territo-
r t,rl lrorrndaries-of states focuses on the connection between citizens
rn,l llr<rir politicalretrresentatiaes. Democratic representatives mustbe
rr r,rrrrrtable to a specified demos. As Seyla Benhabib has argued,
lllrrrocratic laws require closure precisely because democratic
status quo. My point is that *e hur. reasons internal ," d.;;;;;;
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because the state (1) is the 
-pri-ury i.rrt.rment fbr securing theconditions of democracy, (r) r.ru., u, the prirnary site of soli_darity conducive to democratic participation, and (3) establishesclear lines of accountability betwe..r'..pr.."rtatives and theirconstituents.
, 
Among the many objections one might raise is that democratictheory, properly understood, p..r.rpp'or.. an unbounded demos.Focusing directly on the issue of t 
".a.. .o.rtrot, Arash Abizadehhas argued that the democratic theory of popular sovereignty isincompatible with .the,state sovereignty view,,, which says immi_gration control should be under the" unilateral discretion of thestate itself. Abizadeh comes to this conclusion by wayof two *;
:'::11]^:1"lll9-d.T"'is, in principl", ,,rbo.,.'aed, and (2) that
we have reasons internal to d.-o..u.y f"; ;;;J;_'"" lri-J;according to the territorial boundari.s tf th. ,tut..
. 
Abizadeh argues that the incoherence of attempts to boundthe demos also stems from an externality problem: state action,
democratic justification fo. a state,s' ,.gi;. of border control isowed to all those subject to the border regim.,, 
.o...i_r. ;;;;He defends the first premise by arguing tiat th" .orrt.ury.t-t 
.Ji.(that the demos is inherently U"".rt.aii, incoherent. The inco-herence is said to stem partly from the ,,boundary problem,, indemocracy theory: that democracy,,cannot be brought to bear onthe logically prior matter of the constitution of the group itself,the existence of which it presuppor.r.",rr-4" I have i.gr;a ;l*_where, the claim that democratii iheory.u.rro, answer the bound_ary problem rests on a narrow, proceduralist conception of democ_
racy'103 If we instead view democr acy as arr.oua.. set of substantive
::l?,:Yf lp]:: : l:,uding the prin cipre or pouti.ui .quari,y;
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trrr lrrding its border policies, always involves exercising coercive
p()w(:r over members and nonmembers, and such power must be
lrrrtified to all subjected to coercion. This point connects to Abi-
r,rrk'h's second major premise that interprets the idea of demo-
' 
r,rti<: Iegitimacy as requiring all those subject to a state's coercive
1rr rrvcr to have an equal say in the exercise of that power.1oa V\ihile I
,rp,rcr: with Abizadeh that justification is owed to all those subject
ro rlro coercive power of the state, I disagree with the conclusion
tlr,rt 
. 
justification must take the form of equal enfranchisement of
,rll rrrcmbers and nonmembers in state policy making. It is plausi-
lrh' to think the demand for justification can be met in other ways
tlr,rt rrre compatible with democratic principles, such as supporting
1',,licics that respect the basic human rights of all those subjected
to tlrt' policy and supporting the development of democratic insti-
Irrtiorrs in the home states of nonmembers.
( )rre reason for thinking that it may be compatible with dem-
lr r:rlir: principles to have different responses for members and
rr,,rrrrrcmbers arises from distinguishing coercion and author-
Itr irr theorizing democratic legitimacy. Abizadeh interprets the
prrrrciple of democratic legitimacy as requiring justification to
,rll tlrose who are subject to a state's coerciue power. Anotlter way of
,rlrproaching democratic legitimacy is more attentive to, in.foshua
I .lrt'rr's words, "democracy's institutional character": democratic
l, ;,r11,,ru., "arises from the discussions and decisions of members,
,r. rrr:rrle within and expressed through social and political insti-
tutr()ns designed to acknowledge their collectiue authority." We can
rr , , rgrrize that democracy comes in many forms, but "more deter-
rrrrrt(' conceptions of it depend on an account of membership
trr tlrc people, and correspondingly, what it takes for a decision to
l" rttll.u:liue-made by citizens 'as a body."'105 The demos is not an
rt,f'r(',lation of individuals coerced by the same power but rather
r r r l r rr lr rring collective that makes decisions with binding authority.
I t ( rlizt'ns of a Tizrritorial State, in Virtue of Their Role as Members
"1 tltr' ('li,rritorially Defined) Demos, Haae the Right to Control
l, I t r t r t t i on and Membership
ll r l,rirrrs 1 to 3 are plausible, then it is citizens of a territorial
,t.rtr', irr virtue of their role as members of the territoriallv defined
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representation must be accorrntable to a specific people.,,1oo A sys-
::: :: ::^:1I":1 ::0.:'.1tario: ensures tirat poriticar representa-rives know in advancl b uhomthey are 
".."""ri'Jr.]il#ilil#-resentatives know they are acting on behalf of'the citizens of theirstate, and the soridarity based on a common poritical culture wtil;a state is likely to make representatives more attentive to their con-stituents than if the constituents were all of humaniq, ;";;rtd;
:"fl 
' ?h:i i:f :'-,:i..qt'"d:c, demoi defi ned by the,,au subj ec ted,, or"all affected"principles of democrari. ld;;;J, -" r uJLLLsu urIn sum, the demos should be bou"ndea by state boundaries
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demos, who have the right to control bord.ers and membership.citizens are both the ultimate beneficia,es and the urtimateauthors of the exercise ofjurisdictiorrut uriho.ity, ,h.rrg; ;;;;:cra.tic processes of participition u"a ..p*r.ntation.
,,"llj:i::1T:: :l: qroperryjustin.utt", ir,e state,s right to con-urL 1.,rvpc /Jusunca on th _trol immigration is neither anlnstance oirro. derived from privateproperry rights; it is ajurisdictional right. In contrast,o,t..rfltural and nationalist ationis,o,g.o,;d;ffi ",":,:#;ffiT;:?l;:.:"T.,:"i;ffi 
::f-ing a distinctive culture or,national identity; it rests on the right of
il.#i:,:,i:"T,:.::*=]I denn:d g.T;, to be serf_governingas political equals. Self-governar.. irr.t.rJ", 
"", ""r, .":ili;:?current co,ective decision making and the future direction of thepolitical system but also the righl to ..grtut. admission into theterritory and inro full memberr"t ip. t., .3"i*r, to the freedom ofassociation arsument, the state,s,ign,,o 
.ort.ot immigration does
"":.:.1 on analogies with-.marriige, religiom urro.i"iutio";, ;;;golf clubs, and it does not elide pr"i..q, ffi,s over golf clubs withjurisdictionar rights over a ,tut.t t.i.itory. ?n. srare is importantlydisanalogous from other associations noi only because state mem_bership is tlpically nonvoluntary U.rt utro-necause of the state,sindispensable role in meeting tire constitutive and instrumentarconditions of democratic parti"cipation and-representation.
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r 
'' 
r rt |irl to any debate about the ethics of migration. In this chapter,
I lrrrr.'t: argued that the state has a pro tanto right to control immi-
gr,rtion based on the normative requirements of democracy. This
tr rrol to say that this right is an absolute constraint that "trumps"
,rll other considerations. Pro tanto reasots for action are tJpically
r or r I lasted with conclusory reasons for action; the latter require us
rr ,r( t, regardless of other considerations in play. Pro tanto reasons
,r l r('actions for action, but they may be overridden by competing
r r',rsons.r07 The next step is to develop a broader normative frame-
rrrrrk lbr considering the claims of migrants alongside the claims
lI 
1 
x rlitical community.
ln :rddition, I want to clari$, that the democratic argument for
llrr slate's right to control immigration is not an argument for
r l, rscd borders" or "exclusion." The democratic argument offered
lrlrc speaks to the question of who has the right to control, not
Irnrv open or closed borders should be. I believe democratic politi-
, ,rl r ornmunities have strong reasons, arising from the values and
1'r rrrciples of liberal democracy, for supporting more porous bor-
'l, r policies than most countries have pursued in practice. Explor-
irrp 11r.,." reasons and their implications for contemporary immi-
gr,rtion policy is a task I leave for another day. The point of this
,lr,rptcr has been to take seriously the idea of the democratic right
ll 11'll-6lq1..mination and its implications for who has the right to
r,rr I r'ol immigration.
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""; p.";i;;;an answer to the important questiorr, fro* should ,rr. ,,uti,r.iui*to control immigration be weighed against the migrant,s claimto enter? To answer this questiJn, w. i..d ,o .o.rrl"d.r-";, ;l;the perspective of the polirical communitv Ur, ut.o it . ;;#Jtive of misrants. More ihan twenty_five yelrs ago,.foseph Carensfamously made the case for open'bo.dir., 
.orr.traing ..there islittle 
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THREE MISTAKES IN OPEN
BORDERS DEBAIES
ADAM B. COX
\\ l'.'r ilright justi{, laws that restrict the free movement of people
r, r,,rr in(crnational borders? In this chapter I hope to correct
tll,, rolnmon mistakes made by those who try to answer this
,lilr',ll()il.
l'rr:t, I argue that debates about open borders often conflate
rIrr, , r1rrite distinct questions-about whether border restrictions
r, , \('r pcrmissible, about when they are permissible, and about
r, Ir,, 1,1'15 to decide which are permissible. Keeping these questions
,, l,,ll,rl(', us well as understanding the analytic relationship among
rl, rr. rs crucial to making progress on philosophical issues related
r', rrrt t rr;rlional migration.
',r r orr(1, I want to draw attention to a historical mistake that often
l,rrl rrr the background of open borders debates. Early Ameri-
, ,rr rrrrrrrisration jurisprrrdence often features prominently in dis-
',,,.r,ns lry both legal scholars and political philosophers. This is
r,, rr',r' tlre canonical cases from the period of Chinese exclusion
rr, 111111 1y seen as the moment when the U.S. Supreme Court def-
rr,rr, lr rr'lccted open borders claims and laid out the legal justifi-
,r,,'n l()r'state-imposed restrictions on migration. fu I will show,
l', .,, ( \ (' r . t lr is view is mistaken. These canonical cases were not about
,t,, r l){,r rkrrs arguments, and as a result they have little or nothing
,r .rlx rut what mightjustify restrictions on migration.
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